Information from the study of toxins by hard sciences like toxicology is interpreted based on affective, emotional, and instinctive psychologic cues discovered by social science. Understanding and respecting these soft science insights can help toxicologists better communicate their work and findings and have greater influence on the choices of individuals and policy makers.
For the sake of this discussion, permit me to divide toxicology into two sections, basic and applied. My reflections deal with the latter, the part of the study of poisons that tries to bring what we can know into the realm of what we can do about it. Applied toxicology is vitally important, ever more so in a modern information/technology world that accelerates the development of new substances and processes of both promise and potential peril. But the ability of applied toxicology to help guide us safely through this progress is limited. We need to understand the limitations of toxicology and toxicologists, in order to maximize the good this important science can do.
There are two problems. First, the study of poisons is a hard science that deals with illness and death . . . matters of survival. You would think most people would wholeheartedly support a science with a proven track record of producing knowledge that has reduced illness and death. But when it comes to judging whether our survival is in jeopardy, cold hard facts play only a limited role, and often conflict with what feels safest. The perception of risk-the way we interpret information in order to survive-is a subjective, affective mix of facts and feelings, intellect and instinct, reason and gut reaction. So no matter how thoroughly we study poisons, no matter how wisely and insightfully and honestly that work is done, and no matter how clearly the methods and results are communicated, the products of toxicology will conflict with the inherent way the human animal perceives and responds to danger. In short, the problem is that the evidence from toxicology will have to compete with, even as it informs, how people feel about risk.
Then there is the second problem. Toxicology is done by scientists. Nothing personal toward my friends in the sciences, but scientists do not think about things the way normal people do, an attribute that is great for their work, but not so great for bringing that work into the real world of decision making where the rest of us live. Here is the problem. Scientists think about things. Thoroughly. Analytically. Precisely. They are cautious about leaping to conclusions. They take their time. They qualify assumptions not supported by experimentally tested evidence. Scientists do their best to use reason, not emotion, as their guide. Indeed, scientists bow before the false God of reason.
Note that I say false God. Therein lies the problem. As the satirist Ambrose Bierce wisely observed, the brain is merely ''. . . the organ with which we think we think.'' The Editor's Note: Risk perception is a critical interface between scientific facts and personal opinions and values. As a science that generates data to identify potential hazards to human and environmental health, toxicologists find themselves integrally and intricately engaged in translating the concepts of risk to the general public. However, the underlying, innate, and individual reaction to information about hazard or risk is an area that toxicologists may not readily appreciate or understand. In this two-part article for this month's 50th anniversary review, David Ropeik provides an overview of risk perception and challenges toxicologists to think beyond rational instincts to improve how we engage in communicating risks to the general public. The second part of the article is a response to this challenge by Dr Heather Wallace. In tandem, the articles are designed to help toxicologists understand the scope and gravity of issues surrounding the psychology of risk perception so as to stimulate ideas and strategies on how to improve this important interface. With better understanding and recognition of these issues, we can strive for more effective risk assessment and risk communication.
Enlightenment ideal of Immanuel Kant-''All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason''-flies in the face of mountains of evidence, scientific evidence, that intellect and reason, and even just basic conscious thinking and cognition, play far less of a role in the judgments and choices we make than scientists and devotees of reason would like to admit. Far more influential are powerful subconscious information processing tools, and instincts, and emotional triggers and filters, all of them apparently hardwired into the architecture and chemistry of the naked ape, that allow us to turn partial information into the quick judgments we have to make, moment by moment, as we live our lives. Conscious reason may be the idealized goal of how we are supposed to think, but reality is much closer to the way Remarque (1982) described the human process of risk perception it in All Quite on the Western Front; ''By the animal instinct that is awakened in us we are led and protected. It is not conscious; it is far quicker, much more sure, less fallible, than consciousness.'' These two gaps, between the rational analytic science of toxicology and the affective/emotional/instinctive way the human brain processes information and between the hard scientist's faith in reason and the social science evidence that reason can only take us so far, create a chasm which is almost impossible for the evidence from applied toxicology to bridge. I have only the slightest knowledge of the toxicologist's side of that chasm, but a fair understanding of the human risk perception process that forms the other side. In the hope that an understanding of that process can help applied toxicology contribute to public and environmental health and safety, the following is a summary of what various sciences have learned about the irrational way the human animal interprets what toxicologists try to rationally understand.
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF RISK PERCEPTION
We begin with the hard science of the brain. Neuroscientists have learned a great deal about the way the brain perceives and responds to danger, and none of it is good news for fans of reason. Both the physical architecture and biochemistry of the brain insure that emotion and instinct have the upper hand over reason and rationality. Nothing could make this point more clearly than to state that the conscious awareness of fear is merely a post hoc cognitive description of what your brain, and body, have already been up to in the name of self-protection. Before you know you are afraid, you are.
The inescapable truth that, when it comes to risk, we are hardwired to feel first and think second, and feel more and think less, must be accepted by all the risk sciences. So the foundational neuroscience of risk perception bears description in a bit more detail. Research by Joseph LeDoux, Elizabeth Phelps, and others have found that when raw data arrive in the brain, via the external senses or internally through memory, its first stop is in the area called the thalamus. The thalamus does some very simplistic processing of the data, but its principal job is as a relay station, to quickly send the crudely processed information on to other areas for further analysis. Immediately adjacent to the thalamus down in the limbic region just above the brain stem sits the amygdala, the section of specialized brain cells about the size of the top half of your thumb entrusted with the job of screening information for possible danger.
This proximity gives the amygdala a huge advantage over other parts of the brain where higher order processing, or what we might think of as thinking, takes place. The thalamus relays its crudely processed information to several areas, but because of its location the information gets to the amygdala first, and the amygdala does not wait around for the cognitive cortex to do a fact-based rational risk analysis. The amygdala screens the information for any hint that there might be danger, and if any is detected it immediately sets off a Fight or Flight or Freeze (I add 'Freeze' because lots of animals do that too) response. According to LeDoux, it takes an additional 20-30 ms for the same information to travel from the thalamus out to the prefrontal cortex, where we do a lot of higher order thinking and decision making . . . for the prefrontal cortex to process/ analyze those data . . . and for that processed information to travel from the prefrontal cortex back down to the amygdala. By which time, if the amygdala had detected the possibility of peril, the alert has already been sounded. We are hardwired to react to potential risk with subconscious instinct first and conscious reason second.
As the response continues beyond the initial sounding of the alarm, the cascade of events and neural circuits and chemistry involved in the Fight or Flight or Freeze response continue to favor of emotion and instinct over cognition and reason. We not only fear first and think second, we fear more and think less. As LeDoux (1996) put it in his book The Emotional Brain (38) ''While conscious control over emotions is weak, emotions can flood consciousness. This is so because the wiring of the brain at this point in our evolutionary history is such that the connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger than the connections from the cognitive systems to the emotional systems.''
The connectivity between the emotional and cognitive systems has profound implications for scientists who want their hard data to inform rational public policy making. The human brain is just not designed to do it that way. Yes, we do have the capacity to think, and use the facts, and reason, but doing so requires overcoming some of the most innate and powerful architecture and chemistry in the brain, the neural systems that have evolved to help us perceive and respond to danger, and stay alive.
We cannot undo this wiring nor redesign (or drug away) its basic biochemistry, but we need not surrender to this affective less-than-perfectly-rational system. We have learned a lot about 2 ROPEIK the emotional language of the amygdala. Other areas of science have helped discover how this small clump of specialized cells can tell if some raw information portends danger. We have not figured it out at the reductionist level of electrical and chemical impulses across synapses, but at the level of psychology, we know a great deal about why some information triggers a fear response and some does not. We know why some risks feel scarier than others. We understand a great deal about why our fears so often do not seem to match the facts. Understanding that psychology provides the opportunity for risk data, and reason, to participate more fully in the judgments our brain makes about what toxicology tells us. The following section offers a summary of what we have learned about the psychology of the perception of risk that serves to introduce you to the rich and detailed insights that exist about why people's feelings about the evidence from toxicology so often conflict with the
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RISK PERCEPTION
Assume for a moment that there is a professional athlete just outside your door. Is that person bigger than you, the same size, or smaller? You probably said bigger, based on what you know about the general body size of professional athletes. But you did not know everything you needed to know to make a fully informed judgment; what sport does the athlete play, is the person male or female (or even an animal), basic things like that. You suffered from something called Bounded Rationality, limits on what you knew, and how much time you had before having to decide. This is how we all live our lives moment-tomoment. We have evolved to make decisions, on the fly, before all the facts are in. This sort of quick decision-making ability is crucial, especially when it comes to survival (Simon, 1990) .
So we use a set of mental shortcuts to make sense of the partial information we do have and come up with a choice or judgment. The academic literature refers to these as heuristics and biases. You applied one called ''Representativeness'' in the example above. You applied the partial information you had against preexisting knowledge which the partial information seemed to represent. You opened the mental filing cabinet labeled ''Professional Athletes,'' did a quick scan for ''size,'' and made your decision; your only partially informed decision.
Here is another one: ''Framing.'' Imagine you are the mayor of a city of one million residents. A fatal infectious disease is spreading through town. Cases are mostly, but not exclusively, in one neighborhood of 5000 people. With the available funds, you can either The two questions ask the same thing, but they are framed differently, and the framing shapes how you think about the data and the choices you make. When I pose this challenge to groups of people, sizeable minorities choose Option A, and rescue 20% of the most affected neighborhood, thereby condemning a like number of citizens to death. Remember, these heuristics and biases have developed to help us make decisions quickly, not thoroughly. And sometimes that means the decisions we make are wrong.
There are several other important subconscious mental shortcuts we use to make our way through lives lived under conditions of Bounded Rationality.
Optimism bias. We tend to see the future through rosecolored glasses. Large majorities of people estimate that their marriages, health, career earnings, children, even their vacations and holidays, will turn out better than average.
Loss aversion. Essentially this is the opposite effect, and it takes over as the ''future'' becomes ''the present.'' When the details get clearer and the risks and benefits and pros and cons are more imminent, we place far more emphasis on the potential loss than the potential gain. Gilbert (2006) describes the shift from optimism bias to loss aversion as ''forecasting turns into nexting.'' Consider this example of how Optimism Bias shifts to Loss Aversion: Imagine an exciting SCUBA trip you are planning to the South Pacific, to dive among sharks. Sounds exciting six months off in the rose-colored future. It probably feels a little scarier as you stand on the side of the boat ready to jump in the water.
Anchoring and adjustment. When numbers or quantities are involved, the first value we hear sets the ''anchor'' from which we adjust subsequent estimates. In one experiment described in Judgment under Uncertainty, Heuristics and Biases (Kahneman et al., 1982) , two groups of similarly educated people were asked what percentage of nations in the United Nations are African. Each group was first asked to spin a wheel of chance. As it was secretly rigged to do, for the first group, the wheel stopped at 65. That became the numeric anchor in their heads. For the second group, the wheel was rigged to land on 10. The first group estimated 45% of the nations in the United Nations are African. The second group, anchoring from a lower starting value, guessed 25% (The answer is 28%. 53 of 192 UN member states are African.)
Awareness. The more readily something can be brought to mind, the more important the amygdala considers that information, and the more sensitive to potential danger in that information we will be. Awareness bears not only on what we have learned in the past, but what is in the news at the moment. The greater the awareness of a current risk, the more worried about it we are likely to be.
RISK PERCEPTION IN TOXICOLOGY-PART I
These heuristics and biases are general tools we use for all decision making under conditions of imperfect information . . . the reality of Bounded Rationality. But other psychological research, specifically focused on our fears, has identified a number of affective/emotional/instinctive characteristics that make some situations feel scarier than others, the facts notwithstanding. This too is a longer literature than amenable for full discussion here, but what follows is a summary of the risk perception factors that bear directly on how people feel about issues relevant to toxicologists.
Is the risk human made or natural? We are more afraid of risks that are human made, or human tinkered with, than risks that are natural. This risk factor alone keeps a good deal of the applied toxicology industry busily employed. It's why we heavily regulate pharmaceuticals, but not herbal or natural medicines. A community in California considering two insecticides to control mosquito larvae chose the one that was slightly more toxic to people because it was natural. A woman living across the street from the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania remains convinced that radiation was released from the 1979 accident there caused cancer deaths (not so) but has not tested her house for radon, a radioactive gas, despite the high concentration of uranium, source material for radon, in the region's bedrock. She is not worried about radon, she says ''. . . because it's not man-made.'' Uncertainty. The less we know, or the less we understand, the more afraid we are likely to be. Essentially, the fewer facts our brains have to work with, the more we protect ourselves with instincts and emotions. Uncertainty comes in three basic forms, each of which is squarely relevant to toxicology.
When we cannot detect it. We worry more about the things toxicologists study, risks like chemicals and radiation, because we cannot detect them with our own senses. Less direct knowledge ¼ uncertainty ¼ more concern.
When we cannot understand it. Many of the targets of toxicology-chemicals and nuclear radiation and genetic engineering-are among the products of modern scientific knowledge which is hard for most non-scientists to understand.
When we just do not know yet. It is one thing when most of the answers are in and scientists understand them, even if we do not. It is more frightening when a new product or process or technology comes along offering great benefits and promise, but even science does not have the key answers about whether it is safe.
Uncertainty is the fundamental affective driver behind the Precautionary Principle (PP). How do we protect ourselves when we do not know . . . when we are unsure? The decades of discussion and argument over the PP are testament to how risk perception is at its heart a subjective, affective, emotional process, not readily resolved by some knowable absolute factual truth. Terrifically bright people use rich arguments of fact to argue their case about the PP, but in the end it is not about those facts. It is how those facts feel. The debate over the PP is a debate about values, and the sooner all sides put that messy reality on the table for open honest discussion, the sooner we'll come up with some sort of workable approach.
Dread (pain and suffering). The greater the pain and suffering the risk might cause, the scarier it will feel. This helps explain why the study of carcinogens is particularly effected by such strong emotions and excessive fears. The family of diseases known as cancer are widely feared to involve greater suffering than many other causes of death.
Choice. A risk that feels imposed feels scarier than the same risk if we choose to take it ourselves. People are particularly fearful of carcinogens to which they are exposed involuntarily (versus, say, the sun, to which we expose ourselves voluntarily and which is also less worrisome because it is natural.) Many people say that cancer worries them more and heart disease-statistically a much greater riskworries them less, because heart disease feels ''. . . like something I can do something about.'' We can choose to diet and exercise and reduce the risk of heart disease and that choice reduces the fear. (Public health experts say we can reduce the risk of mortality of both cancer and heart disease by about the same amount, as much as 60-70%, by the same dietary and lifestyle choices. But that is not the common perception.)
Can it happen to ME? It seems entirely rational that we should worry more about risks we think might happen to us than risks that only threaten others. However, this is the psychological factor that leads people to irrationally ignore risk statistics. One in a million is too high a risk if you think you could be the one. After all, the survival of the other 999,999 people in the population is not your primary genetic imperative. Your job is to get the numerator-you-to tomorrow, not the denominator.
Harms versus benefits. Sometimes consciously, but often subconsciously, we weigh risks and benefits, and the greater the benefit feels, the less worried about the risk we are likely to be. It is important to note here that both sides of this equation are weighed affectively, not quantitatively. It is how risky something feels and how the benefit side feels. You may shop carefully for a motor vehicle that affords the best mileage, has the best safety ratings, and strongest resale value. But if you really like the way one looks over another, and its numbers do not quite stack up against another choice that does not strike your fancy aesthetically, the numbers you gathered will play less of a role in your final choice.
This factor overlaps with Loss Aversion bias described above. A choice offering equivalent harm and benefit is an easy one . . . the harm is likely to carry more weight. And remember, it is how the harm or benefit feels. So if the harm from a product or process is potentially cancer, the additional fear the ''Pain and Suffering'' factor invokes will feed into Loss Aversion, and the benefit of the product or process will have to 4 ROPEIK significantly exceed the potential harm before the scales tip toward acceptance of that product or process.
Trust. Trust plays a powerful role in all human decisions, but particularly so when it comes to risk. We are exquisitely sensitive, as social creatures, to whether we can trust others with our health and safety-our survival. If we trust the people or organizations that are supposed to protect us, or the people or organizations creating the risk in the first place (creating a product or process, or setting a safety standard that allows a certain amount of exposure), we will be less afraid than if we do not trust them. If we trust the people explaining a risk to us, their explanation will carry more weight than if we do not trust them. If we trust the process by which the risk was ''approved,'' the risk will worry us less than if we do not trust the approval process.
Trust in scientists is generally high. But woe to the scientist accused of taking money from a source that might influence their findings. Woe to a scientist who works for an organization that profits from the potentially risky product or process the scientist studies. Woe to a scientist or an organization that keeps a secret that could be relevant to public or environmental health or safety. (Remember, we want choice. Keeping secrets denies us the information we feel we need to make an informed choice. Keeping the secret to protect profits, or a political agenda-for selfish reasons-is doubly destructive.) The research of that scientist might be of the first order, robust, replicable, and reviewed. It would not matter if we cannot trust the person who came up with those facts. Remember, risk perception is how the facts feel, and if we cannot trust the source of the facts, the information itself will have little influence on our perception of the risk.
THE CHALLENGE TO TOXICOLOGISTS
Woe to the scientist who fails to respect the intrinsic affective nature of the human risk perception system and denigrates people whose fears do not match the facts as ''irrational.'' The attitude that people are too dumb to ''get it,'' too poorly educated to ''get it,'' too emotional to ''get it,'' too easily manipulated by politicians and marketers to be able to make smart decisions for themselves, slaps people in the face with an arrogance that diminishes trust, and reduces the influence the scientist might hope to have. No matter how benignly the science community tries to ''educate'' the public, if the underlying message of that effort is a paternalistic attitude toward people's limited abilities to perceive and respond to risk rationally, that effort will fail.
A 2010 report from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, ''Do Scientists Understand The Public?'' spoke to just this issue and is worth a brief mention here. Why, it wondered, do the same facts on climate change produce such polarized opposite views? Why does overwhelming evidence that vaccines do not cause autism fail to convince? Why are we not more worried about fossil fuel waste-that is, air pollution that kills tens of thousands of people a year than nuclear waste?
The assumptions in the article were familiar (Mooney, 2010): People are too dumb to ''get it.'' Science education is inadequate. Scientists are either arrogant, or lousy communicators, or both.
Vested interests are jerking us around.
There is some truth to all of those assumptions, but they are the wrong assumptions. The report hints at but unfortunately glosses over the real issue. There is no ''It'' to ''Get.'' The human perception of fact, whether about risk or anything else, is not a solely fact-based process. The Cartesian/Enlightenment ideal of perfect reason may be an attractive goal, but it flies in the face of overwhelming scientific evidence, some of which is summarized briefly above, that facts, by themselves, are meaningless, in the purest sense of that word.
In his book ''Descartes Error,'' D'Amasio (1994) described a subject named Eric who could pass every intellectual test with flying colors but could not make a choice, about anything, because brain surgery to remove a tumor had severed the connections between his ''thinking'' cognitive cortex and the limbic ''feeling'' parts of the brain. Facts, to Eric, had no value, no ''good or bad,'' no ''pro or con.'' Pure raw information had no valence, no meaning. One option never felt ''better'' than another, so he could not choose. He lost spouses jobs, homes. He was intellectually competent, but affectively numb, and dysfunctional.
The meaning of information comes via what Slovic et al. (2002) labeled the Affect Heuristic, a catch-all phrase for all the factors that make the facts feel one way or another; our heuristics and biases, the instinctive psychological factors that make some risks feel scarier than others, the cultural attitudes of the groups with which we most strongly identify (much more on this theory, known as Cultural Cognition, at http:// www.culturalcogntion.net), along with our own personal experiences, education, and life circumstances.
Alone, facts are lifeless stones on the ground. They only become the living walls of our perceptions and ideas based on our interpretations of how they fit together. We can bemoan this ''irrational'' behavior all we want, and we can decry how it gets us into trouble; by worrying too much about cancer and not enough about heart disease, by demanding more government protection from the 1 in a million carcinogen, by proposing a PP so severe it restricts the potential benefits of new products or processes. It is absolutely true that our risk perception system, evolved to deal with simpler threats in earlier days, has not caught up to the complex challenges of our modern age, and that we get risk wrong, at our peril.
RISK PERCEPTION IN TOXICOLOGY-PART I
Sometimes we are too afraid of lesser risks, and sometimes we are not afraid enough of bigger ones. The sciences of risk perception psychology explain this phenomenon, which I call The Perception Gap, the gap between our fears and the facts that raises risks in and of itself (Ropeik, 2010) . Getting risk wrong is undoubtedly a peril with which modern society has to come to grips.
Unfortunately, the search for ways to solve the problems of risk perception, like better science education and better scientist communicators, misses the intrinsic reality that this affective process is how the human animal perceives the world: Period. So in the pursuit of public and environmental health, which are certainly among the goals of applied toxicology, let us move past the rationalist pretense that there can ever be ''perfect'' knowledge, some true truth which, with a little more science literacy and better communication by scientists, we can all understand and agree on and accept the rich detailed evidence we have from several fields of science about the subjective ways people process information. May I suggest that the most rational way to help reduce risk is to rationally recognize that the perception of risk is not, nor can it be at this point in our evolution, a rational process. Recognizing how the risk perception process works is the first step to help us think past our instincts and make more careful, balanced, healthier choices for ourselves, and for the future of the species.
